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Economic Credentialing: Bottom-Line Medical Care

INTRODUCTION

Norman Rockwell's paintings of the benevolent and trusted
doctor offering his patients gentle ministrations defined the popular
image of the physician-patient relationship of the 1940's and 1950's.
In contrast, if Mr. Rockwell had had the opportunity to depict the
physician-patient relationship of the 1990's, he probably would have
shown the physician holding a stopwatch while he rushes one waxy
patient out of the office as he quickly ushers in the next. Perhaps,
in his 1990's painting, Mr. Rockwell also would have included an
insurance company representative whispering in the doctor's ear
about the appropriateness of the procedure the physician had just
performed on the exiting patient.
Recent advancements in information technology allow hospitals
to measure precisely a physician's past economic and financial
performance with respect to patient care, enabling them to create
financial and economic profiles of physicians that are ultimately
used by hospitals in credentialing,' contracting, or making staff
appointments and/or reappointments. 2 The new focus of hospitals
on economic and financial factors relating to patient care has
significant future implications for the quality of medical care.
Increasingly, physicians are evaluated on criteria such as: number
of patients treated, time allotted to each patient, amount of
1. VERGIL N. SLEE, M.D., HALTH CARE TERMs 34 (1st ed. 1986). "Credentialing" describes
the process of granting physicians hospital privileges in accordance with their medical
credentials. Id. These credentials include: medical diplomas, state licenses, and specialty
certifications. Supplemental credentials examined include: academic preparation, training,
and performance at other hospitals. Id. Granting of privileges or an "appointment" to a
hospital is the responsibility of the hospital's governing body. This group normally follows
the recommendation of the medical staff organization that appoints the physician after the
hospital's credentials committee has verified and investigated the physician's credentials. Id.
2. The American Medical Association ("AMA") defines "economic credentialing" as the
"use of economic criteria unrelated to quality of care or professional competency in
determining an individual's qualifications for initial or continuing medical staff membership
or privileges." See AMA, Economic Credentialing, Report of the Hospital Medical Staff
Section Governing Council Report Q (1993).
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insurance reimbursement received, number of referrals and
consultations, medication costs, liability claims, patient satisfaction
surveys, and other similar economic factors. 3 The terms "economic
efficiency" and "cost containment," frequently touted by hospitals,
are merely euphemisms for economic credentialing. This new
emphasis on financial and economic factors necessarily reduces the
stature of traditional credentialing criteria, including: clinical skills,
medical competence, experience in treating patients, and patient
care results. As hospitals consolidate, they are forced to focus even
more on financial considerations, rather than on patient outcome.
Ultimately, financial interests of hospitals and insurance companies
will take precedence over the more important societal interest of
high-quality medical care.
BACKGROUND

Traditionally, physicians and hospitals provided services and
were paid by the patient.4 Direct payment limited the amount of
money expended on health care, but it also limited the
performance of unnecessary services. 5 Blue Cross developed what
we now think of as the conventional health insurance system
during the "Great Depression" of the 1930's.6 Later, the federal
government entered the health care field, through Congressional
enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs under Title
XVIII of the Social Security Act of 1965. 7 Health care costs
3. John D. Blum, Economic CredentialingMoves from the Hospital to Managed Care,
22 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 65 (1995).
4. ROBERT G. SHOULDICE & KATHERINE H SHOULDICE, MEDICAL GROUP PRACTICE 1-11 (1978).
5. MARC A- RODWIN, J.D., Ph.D., MEDICINE, MONEY AND MORALS 13 (1993).
6. Jeff C. Goldsmith, Ph.D., Managed Care Comes of Age, HEALTHCARE FORUM J. i4-16
(Sep./Oct. 1995). See also SHOULDICE, supra note 4, at 4-12.
7. Pub. L No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290 (1965). Title XVIH established a two-part program of
health insurance for the aged known as Medicare. Patients are eligible to participate in
Medicare, Part A (the hospital insurance program), if they: (1) are 65 or older and are
receiving retirement benefits under Title 11 of the Social Security Act or the Railroad
Retirement Act, (2) qualify under a special program for persons with end-stage kidney
disease, or (3) qualify under the special transitional program. Persons not qualifying, but who
are over 65, may participate by paying premiums. Anyone aged 65 or older, who is a United
States citizen or has been a permanent resident alien for 5 years may elect to enroll in
Medicare, Part B (a supplementary medical -insurance). Id.
Medicare covers services provided by a physician to a beneficiary. Claims must be
presented to trigger reimbursement under Part A; reimbursement is a prospectively
determined amount per discharge according to the patient's diagnosis and the facilities
location. See Pub. L No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983) as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat.
1073 (1984); 42 C.YR. Sections 405.470-405.477 (1988). Medicaid is a joint federal state
program designed to provide medical assistance to individuals unable to afford health care.
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increased significantly due to implementation of these programs,
because government funding increased the number of persons
eligible for care. The government's entry into the field of health
care finance caused the cost of medical services to rise
dramatically during the 1970's.
Institutional medicine has rapidly evolved in the twentieth
century, experiencing both an organizational and a financial
transformation.8 This process was perhaps best described by Eli
Ginzberg, who dubbed it, "the monetarization of medical care."9
This emphasis on "the bottom line" has diminished medicine's
reputation because society now perceives it as merely another
expensive commodity in the stream of ordinary commerce. 10 The
doctor of the early twentieth century entered practice after
completing a lengthy apprenticeship and treated most patients with
only the contents of his black bag." Medical economics drastically
changed as training grew more rigorous, hospitals became plentiful,
and medical technology exploded. The cost of providing medical
care burgeoned until it exceeded $400 billion per year in the late
1990's. According to estimates, by the year 2000, the health care
industry will generate $2,000,000,000,000 annually; this figure2
represents 15% of the gross national product of the United States.'
From the 1930's through the 1950's, employment-based voluntary
health insurance became widely available from third-party private
insurers such as Blue Cross, Blue Shield, and others. These
companies paid physicians for health services delivered to insured
patients. In 1965, the federal government supplemented this private
insurance network by creating Medicare and Medicaid, programs
designed to fund medical care of the aged and indigent. 3 Medical
privatization and the public insurance provided by Medicare and
Medicaid allowed many patients to receive premium medical care
for the first time. This care was the best in the world, but cost
Id.
States are not required to have Medicaid programs (Title XIX of the Social Security Act).
Medicaid is different from Medicare in that it provides medical assistance to persons in
financial need, whereas Medicare only has an age limit of 65 or older without regard to
financial need. See SANDY SANBAR, M.D., Ph.D., J.D., ET AL, LEGAL MED. 663-71 (3rd ed. 1995).
8. RODWIN, supra note 5, at 11.

9.
10.
11.
12.
84-1232,
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
National Center for Health Statistics, Health-United States, DHHS Pub. No. (PHS)
U.S. G.PO. (Dec. 1983).
RODWIN, supra note 5, at 13.
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more than a middle-income wage earner could earn in a lifetime. 14
Beginning in the 1970's, the consequences of the third-party
payment system began to surface as the cost of medical care
soared. Physicians worried little about budget constraints. Patients,
similarly, had no incentive to monitor the cost of their medical
care. 15 As a result, in the 1990's, managed care has become the
dominant force in American health care. Managed care embraced
the concept of the Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO"),
which was designed to control spiraling costs. HMOs combine the
risk assumption inherent in insurance with provider responsibility
for cost control. By establishing HMOs, third-party insurers could
provide physician and hospital services to all enrolled members at
a reduced cost. 16 In addition, many traditional indemnity insurers
could now offer managed care products.
"Health maintenance strategies," promulgated by HMOs, were
designed to give participants comprehensive care in return for a
fixed premium. HMOs rendered services through their own doctors
and hospitals or "selected" doctors and hospitals. In an HMO, the
insurer, hospital, and physician belong to a "network," bound by
financial ties. These networks limit physician discretion as to the
type of care delivered to the patient.17
The number of independent sole practitioners and practice group
partnerships is rapidly declining, replaced by joint ventures formed
between physicians and HMOs. Hospitals and HMOs are
increasingly enrolling physicians in their networks or creating other
arrangements that link physicians' financial well-being to the
network. In return, the network asserts the right to control and
review the clinical decisions made by physicians by rewarding
those who utilize network facilities and economize in their use of
network resources. 8 The more frugal a physician is, the more the
system financially rewards him or her.19
To ensure the reduction of medical care costs, both the federal
government and insurance carriers have targeted physicians as the
principal point for cost containment. 0 Increasingly, hospitals face
14. Id. at 13-14.
15. Id.
16. David 0. Weber, Second Thoughts: Can Managed Care Be Ethical? 40 HELTHCARE
FORUM J. 17-24 (1997).
17. RODWIN, supra note 5, at 14.
18.

Id.

19.
20.

Id. at 17.
Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 16-19.
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compelling financial pressures, but because fees and
reimbursements are fixed, they must continually search for
alternate means of reducing costs.2 1 For hospitals and HMOs, the
primary methods for securing cost savings have been: reducing the
number of patient visits, limiting or controlling the length of
hospital stays, streamlining physician practices, and rationing of
expensive treatment.22 The only effective leverage that hospitals
and HMOs can exercise over physicians is using economic
credentialing to eliminate those physicians whose practices are not
cost effective.
In the past, the credentialing procedure a physician underwent to
obtain staff privileges in a health care organization was reviewed
by the hospital or HMO medical staff credentialing committee. The
committee investigated the physician's background, including his
education, competence, ability, experience, and judgment. In
addition, for staff reappointments, the committee subjected
physicians with existing privileges to the same level of review to
ensure that all physicians were competent and providing high
quality care. Although the board of directors of a health care
organization had the final word in any credentialing decision, it
usually deferred to the decision of the medical staff credentialing
committee.2
ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING

The evolution of managed care led directly to the proliferation of
economic credentialing. No universal definition of "economic
credentialing" exists, but it is commonly defined as the practice of
applying economic data and efficiency criteria to hospital medical
staff appointment and reappointment decisions. 24 The American
Medical Association has adopted a somewhat more detailed
definition. It defines "economic credentialing" as "the use of
economic criteria unrelated to quality of care or professional
competency in determining [a physician's] qualifications for initial
25
or continuing hospital medical staff membership or privileges."
21. Id. at 18-20.
22. Id. at 18-23.
23. Brad Dallet, Economic Credentialing:Your Money or Your Life!, 4 HEALTH
MATmx 330 (1994).
24. Nathan Hershey, LLB., Economic Credentialing:A Poor Title for a Legitimate
Assessment Concept, 9 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF MED. QuALrry 3 (1994).
25. Deborah S.Kolb, Randall L. Hughes, & C. Edward Young, Economic Credentialing,
19 Top HEALTHcARE FIN. 59 (1993).
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Hospitals employing economic credentialing typically apply the
following criteria in evaluating physicians:
26
Length of stay by the diagnosis-related group ("DRG"),
Charges by the DRG,
Charges or length of stay adjusted for severity of illness,
27
Utilization review denials
Bad debt expenses,
Timeliness of medical record completion, and
28
Incident reports.

The AMA and other medical organizations are vehemently
opposed to economic credentialing. For these groups, the rationale
is obvious - credentialing of physicians should directly relate to
professional competence - ensuring quality of care for patients. A
physician's peers who are members of the organization's medical
staff should conduct credentialing. 29 The real issue is whether
economic credentialing is an appropriate tool for measuring a
physician's entitlement to hospital privileges or participation in an
HMO when the physician regularly meets objective medical quality
standards, but because of factors wholly unrelated to the quality of
medical care provided, causes an adverse economic drain on the
3
hospital or HMO. 0
Typically, these economic factors relate to cost per covered life
26. PETER R. KONGSTVELDT, M.D., THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 563 (1996). A
"DRG" is a statistical system of classifying by diagnosis any inpatient stay in an institution,
such as a hospital, for purposes of payment. This form of reimbursement is used by the
Health Care Financing Agency to pay hospitals for care of Medicare recipients. The DRG
system has also been applied by a few states to all insurance payors. Id. It is also used by
many private health plans (usually non-HMOs) for contracting purposes. Id.
27. DONALD SNOOK, JP, & KATHRYN M. RucK A GUIDE TO HOSPITAL WORDS, TERMS &
PHRASES 46-47 (1988). A "utilization review committee" is comprised of physicians, nurses,
and administrators. It reviews the medical records of current and discharged patients in
order to determine the medical necessity for their treatment and hospital stay. "Utilization
review denial" is defined as a denial of continued hospitalization and/or admission to the
hospital based on the interdisciplinary review committee's determination that the patient's
hospital admission, the services provided, the length of stay or the hospital's discharge
practices created unnecessary costs. Utilization review is required by the Joint Commission
for Accreditation of Hospital Organizations ("JCAHO"), Medicare, Medicaid, and other
third-party payors and agencies. Id.
28. SLEE, supra note 1, at 66. An "incident" is an event occurring in the hospital in
which a patient is injured, due to the alleged negligence of the hospital. Sometimes this
event is called an "adverse patient occurrence," a broader term that includes unexpected
results of a patient's treatment as well as accidents. Id.
29. Hershey, supra note 24, at 4.
30. Howard L Lang, M.D., Economic Credentialing- lWy It Must Be Stopped, 5 THE
MED. STAFF COUNSELOR 19-20 (1991). See also Kolb, et al., supra note 25, at 59-61.
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of the patient. 31 Costs of medical care are easily quantifiable and
provide easy comparisons for measuring medical services. The
proponents of economic credentialing conveniently overlook the
fact that such factors do not readily risk-adjust for other than
32
average patients.
The question is: who is an average patient? No patient can be
accurately classified as "average." Innumerable factors may reflect
on patient care, as each individual patient is unique. A physician
can scrupulously follow clinical practice guidelines. Nevertheless,
patients may still develop unforeseen side effects from the therapy,
fail to respond, or develop unpredictable complications. None of
these occurrences relate to physician malpractice.
A physician's case mix or types of cases based on the severity of
each patient's illness and "risk profile" may affect the physician's
performance. As the number of diseases or the severity of a given
patient's illness increases, the physician's care becomes more
complicated. In all fairness, these factors should be considered in
evaluating that physician.3 In addition, each physician's medical
practice will also exhibit age and sex differences in its patient
population.34 These factors should also be considered as relevant in
35
computing the cost per covered life.
Both the California and New York State Medical Societies are
ahead of other states in developing economic criteria relevant to
the quality of patient care. These criteria are used as additional
secondary evaluation factors, after medical quality criteria, to
credential or recredential a physician for privileges in health care
organizations. 36 The California and New York models include:
clinically unnecessary treatment, inappropriate/excessive testing of
patients, and improper or improvident use of hospital resources
37
that might have an adverse economic impact on the hospital.
These states reject irrelevant criteria that do not relate to quality of
care, such as: revenue per physician, payor mix, and DRG profiling
(comparing profitable DRG categories to non-profitable DRG
categories).8
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
payment

Id.
David Palmer, Clinical Practice Guidelines, 99 PEDIATRICS 101-06 (1997).
KONGSTVELDT, supra note 26, at 440-49.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id.
KONIGSVELDT, supra note 26, at 448. See also supra note 26. "DRG" is a prospective
system for reimbursing hospitals that is based on a system of "Diagnostic Related
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Hospitals and HMOs also utilize physician profiling in such areas
as patient outcome and length of stay, comparing their findings to
a norm. Further, they try to compare physician behavior with other
practices. 39 The problem is that no universally accepted norms for
care or physician behavior have been developed. Moreover, "quality
40
of patient care" remains undefined.
Many health care institutions have developed standard practice
guidelines based on controlled clinical studies supplemented by
data derived from patient outcomes. 41 Some institutions rely on
these guidelines to regulate clinical decision-making and to produce
cost savings. 42 At the very minimum, physicians who do not follow
the "cookbook style" of medicine (those who fail to follow the
practice guidelines) are required to justify any deviations from the
practice guidelines. Failure to provide justification may result in
denial of payments or sanctions. 43 Large-scale studies have never
validated these practice guidelines because varied guidelines exist
against which a particular medical intervention is judged. Serious
doubts have been expressed as to whether these guidelines can
properly identify the correct and appropriate medical intervention.
As a result, many diagnostic tests that would normally be indicated
are excluded because managed care deems them inappropriate. 44
Medical practice and patient care is indeed a science, but the
fact remains that the practice of medicine is an art, combining
scientific knowledge with the clinical experience of the physician.
Most of the practice guidelines, however, rely on a panel of experts
Groups." Id. Under DRG, the hospital is reimbursed a fixed fee fox each patient admitted. Id.
Reimbursement is based on one diagnosis, even if the patient has multiple active medical
problems requiring hospitalization. Id. Regardless of the expense of treatment or the length
of stay, the hospital receives only a single DRG payment based on one diagnosis. Id. "DRG
profiling" refers to choosing the proper diagnosis, thereby allowing the hospital to request
reimbursement from Medicare. Id. "Profitable DRGs" are simple medical problems that are
easily diagnosed, resulting in a short hospital stay for the patient. Id.
When the diagnosis is in doubt, the physician desires to perform procedures or tests to aid
in proper diagnosis and treatment of the patient. This process is clearly opposed to the
hospital's desire to keep expenses down by using minimal resources to diagnose and treat
the patient. Hospitals and HMOs, therefore, have resorted to economic credentialing of
individual physicians to lower the expense of health care and increase their profit margins.
Id.
39. Id.
40. Jerome P Kassirer, M.D., The Quality of Care and the Quality of Measuring It, 329
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1263-64 (1993).
41. Id. at 1263.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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who merely extrapolate data from studies appearing in the medical
literature. Typically, however, these experts are far removed from
the
actual
physician-patient
encounter.45
Managed
care
organizations should not coerce physicians into using economic
guidelines to decide medical issues. Rather, the guidelines should
be voluntarily consulted to inform medical decision making.46 To
date, no proof exists that these guidelines improve quality of care.
Furthermore, large variations in medical practice may cause
physician error if he or she is forced to use these practice
guidelines. 47 It- is also doubtful that the full implementation of
4
practice guidelines would produce cost savings. 8
Because the data compiled by profiling patient outcomes and
physician behavior has been inadequate to assess the quality of
care, health care institutions, such as HMOs and third-party payors,
have continued to focus on the economics of patient care. Reliance
on economic credentialing forces physicians to implement
guidelines designed to save money, without considering the impact
on the quality of health care provided. 49 Economic credentialing has
troublesome implications for physicians who are treating patients
with acute or chronic illnesses that do not fit neatly within the
parameters or guidelines attendant to the economic credentialing
model.50
A study completed in 1987 conclusively demonstrates that
financial incentives do influence the behavior of physicians toward
their patients. 51 The study generally found that the use of financial
*incentives makes a statistically significant difference in the length
of patient stays, illustrating a definite correlation between financial
incentives and the number of patient visits; namely, the greater the
financial risk to the physician, the fewer the visits by patients. 52
Studies have observed that the use of capitation3 or salaries for
45. Kassirer, supra note 40, at 1263.
46. Id. at 1263-64.
47. Id. at 1264.
48. Id.
49. Palmer, supra note 32, at 108-109.
50. Id. See also Lang, supra note 30, at 22-24.
51. Alan L. Hillman, M.D., Mark V. Pauly, Ph.D., & Joseph J. Kerstein, How Do
Financial Incentives Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the FinancialPerformance
of Health Maintenance Organizations?321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86 (1989).
52. Id. at 89-91.
53. KONGSTVELDT, supra note 26, at 989. "Capitation" refers to a set amount of money
received or paid out based on membership in a managed care or insurance plan, not on the
professional services rendered. It also refers to a fixed low monthly plan payment (usually
ranging between $7 and $10 per patient) received by the physician whether or not the
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HMO physicians (compared to physicians paid on a fee-for-service
basis) resulted in physicians hospitalizing patients less often in
for-profit networks.54 Placing individual physicians at personal
financial risk, combined with the imposition of penalties for deficits
in HMO or hospital revenue, has resulted in significantly fewer
outpatient visits ordered by physicians. 55 This reduced number of
outpatient visits was associated with a lower rate of hospitalization,
because more frequent visits lead to discovery of reasons to
hospitalize the patient. Finally, it was found that for-profit HMOs
had lower rates of hospitalization than non-profit HMOs.56 Is it not
evident that reliance on economic credentialing will undermine the
quality of medical care?
ANALYSIS
Hospital Privileges
A physician may not admit a patient to a hospital unless the
hospital grants the physician privileges. 57 A special peer review
committee within the hospital reviews a physician's request for
privileges. The committee reviews the individual physician's
credentials, including medical education, residency training, board
certification, and practical skills (i.e., the number of procedures the
physician has performed), and determines whether the physician
should be granted staff privileges. The extent of privileges granted
to the physician depends on his level of training, expertise, and
staff speciality. For instance, a physician trained in internal
medicine would not be granted privileges in cardiovascular surgery
because an internist does not generally possess this skill. The
hospital would grant the internist privileges to practice medicine
within the hospital only to the level of his training and expertise.
The process by which the hospital determines which particular
physicians may receive hospital privileges is commonly known as
credentialing or peer review.5
patient received services. This fee covers all of the patient's health care services. If a
patient's care exceeds the capitation payment set by the managed health care plan, the
physician becomes personally liable to the plan for the excess patient expenses.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Dallet, supra note 23, at 329.
58. Id. at 329-30. See also Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., THE
AcCREDrrATION MANUAL FOR HosPrrALs 53 (1993).
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Traditionally, the credentialing process focused on a number of
59
criteria relating to a physician's medical and clinical competency.
Hospital credentialing decisions have commonly been based on
such criteria as the physician's experience, ability, judgment and
other related factors designed to ensure quality medical care for
the hospital patient.60 Prior to the recent emergence of economic
credentialing criteria, all physicians seeking hospital privileges for
the first time and those physicians seeking to maintain existing
privileges were subject to the same examination by a peer review
committee to ensure that physicians were competent and providing
61
quality medical care.
In recent years, the health care market has undergone a
due to
increasing
particularly
transformation,
significant
consolidation of hospitals and health care systems and the
emerging importance of managed care. 62 The role of managed care
providers, such as HMOs, and governmental payors in modem
medical care, is pervasive. HMOs, insurance companies, and
government medical programs have the tremendous power to
deprive prospective users of the hospital's medical services.6
Government advocates see the HMO as an attractive model because
of its implicit incentive to maintain a low rate of hospital
admissions. Third-party payors view medical services as a
commodity and search for hospitals charging the lowest prices.64
Due to the overwhelming leverage possessed by managed care
corporations and government medical programs, hospitals are
subject to strict pricing rules and, therefore, cannot bargain or
negotiate the prices of medical services.6 Accordingly, the
strictures imposed by governmental HMOs and insurance company
payors effectively transfer the financial burdens, risks of loss, and
other economic risks to hospitals and physicians.6 The hospitals
respond by developing practices, programs, and incentives designed
to alleviate the financial burden, ultimately shifting the cost to the
patient by decreasing the care received. Physicians, and ultimately
their patients, are thus penalized for increased utilization of
59. See generally Elizabeth A. Snelson, J.D., The Price of Profitability - Economic
CredentialingCan Threaten Health Care Quality, 76 MINN. MED. 37-39 (1993).
60. Dailet, supra note 23, at 330.
61. Id. at 330-31.
62. Hershey, supra note 24, at 4-5.
63. Id. at 4. See also RODWIN, supra note 5, at 4.
64. Id at 4-5.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id.

448
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medical services and hospitalization.
The financial pressures faced by hospitals have compelled them
to evaluate medical service providers on a cost-benefit basis.
Increasingly, hospitals are looking to economic credentialing to
mitigate the financial pressures imposed by governmental and
insurance company payors. For example, hospitals are using
physician credentialing based on such factors as patient length of
stay, hospital reimbursement, referrals, consultations, number of
tests ordered, number of hospital admissions vis-A-vis outpatient
services utilizations, excessive testing, DRG, and other bottom line
67
considerations.
Managed care corporations, such as HMOs and government
payors, will soon displace the traditional fee-for-service practice
with capitation as the primary method of reimbursement for
medical services. 68 The capitation reimbursement system is
generally the process of providing a fixed payment per patient per
month.69 . Pursuant to the capitation system and other similar
reimbursement schemes, hospitals assume the financial risk from
insurance company and government payors. 70 In turn, hospitals are
compelled to impose financial and economic pressure on doctors
and other health care providers.7 The most effective leverage
available to the hospital is the physician credentialing process. By
imposing economic criteria on the physician credentialing process,
hospitals can create incentives for doctors to engage in more
restrained and conservative medical care practices. 72
Ethical and Legal Implications of Economic Credentialing
Economic credentialing by hospitals poses severe ethical and
legal
consequences
that jeopardize
the physician-patient
relationship. Because a physician must be aware of the financial
and economic consideration associated with a particular medical
test, treatment, or care, it necessarily follows that the patient's
welfare may not always be the physician's primary concern.
Economic credentialing by hospitals creates inherent conflicting
67. Blum, supra note 3. See also Snelson, supra note 59, at 37-38.
68. John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialing into Managed Care
Contracting, 22 AM. J. LAw AND MED. 174-77 (1996).
69. Id. at 175.
70. Blum, supra note 3, at 66-67.
71. Id. at 66-68.
72. Blum, supra note 3, at 66-67.
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loyalties for the physician in that he or she must make a choice.
between the patient's well being and the cost of diagnostic
procedures and treatment options that will be reflected in his or
her peer review. Such conflict poses significant ethical and legal
ramifications for physicians and serious consequences for the
patients in their care. By reducing expenditures, promoting
efficiency, and decreasing hospitalization, managed care may, in
some instances, provide better treatment for some patients. It will
likely decrease the quality of life of other patients, however,
because medical judgments will be based on the economic
consequences of the service required. 3
Ethical Issues
The basis of the physician-patient relationship is the patient's
belief that a physician is wholly committed to serving his or her
needs.7 4 The Hippocratic oath states that physicians will do
everything in their power to help their patients. 75 Society expects
doctors to furnish a wide range of services, appropriate diagnostic
testing, and the best treatment necessary to improve a patient's
medical condition and quality of life. 76 Economic credentialing,
however, creates two conflicting loyalties for the physician.
First, physicians must balance the interests of their patients with
the interests of other patients. 77 Under the fiscal realities of
economic credentialing, physicians have an obligation to keep
expenses to a minimum by limiting the use of medical services,
increasing efficiency, shortening the time spent with the patient,
and using specialities very sparingly.78 Therefore, the physician
must decide whether to order a diagnostic test or procedure for a
patient, reserve such tests or procedures for another patient, or
choose not to order the test at all to comply with the fiscal profile
established by the hospital.7 9
Second, the cost constraints inherent in economic credentialing
compel physicians to -choose between the best interests of their
73.

Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 604-05 (1995).

74. Council Report of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues
in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 331 (1995).
75. Id.
76. Jerome P. Kassirer, Managed Care and the Morality of the Market Place, 333 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 50-51 (1995).
77. Council Report, supra note 74, at 331-32.
78. Kassirer, supra note 76, at 50.
79. Council Report, supra note 74, at 331.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 36:437

patients and their own economic survival.80 An unfortunate
by-product of such conflict is a likely reduction in the quality of
care. This is true because it is likely that doctors will- increasingly
limit the services and procedures they provide or fail in their role
as a patient advocate by excluding or rationing care for acute
patients. 81 Economic credentialing
pushes physicians into
excruciating quandaries as they deceive themselves into thinking
that what they are doing is best for the patient when, in fact, they
are deciding not to treat the patient based on their own economic
82
survival.
Legal Issues
Presently, no state or federal appellate decisions have specifically
addressed the issue of economic credentialing. Accordingly, this
Comment focuses on potential legal issues arising from economic
credentialing. In Rosenblum v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional
Medical Center,"' a Florida trial court affirmed a hospital's decision
to deny staff privileges to a reputable and skillful surgeon whose
medical qualifications were beyond reproach, strictly because of
economic factors8 4 In Rosenblum, the hospital denied the physician
privileges in its cardiac department solely because he had a
relationship with a competing hospital. The hospital did not base
the denial on the physician's quality of care, but rather on the
economic consequences of his professional behavior. The state
court judge determined that economic credentialing was a valid
basis for denying hospital privileges under Florida law.
Another potentially negative legal implication related to
economic credentialing involves situations in which a class of
patients or a medical specialty is a money-loser for the hospital
and, therefore, does not meet the hospital's fiscal criteria. The
hospital may consider discontinuing or limiting certain medical
services, thereby reducing the utility of certain physicians' hospital
privileges. Under these circumstances, however, the hospital may
be vulnerable to allegations of antitrust or restraint of trade.8 The
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 198686 provides limited
80.
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Id. See also Council Report, supra note 74, at 331-333.
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antitrust immunity for participants in medical staff peer reviews.
This immunity, however, does not extend to a credentialing
87
decision based solely upon economic considerations.
Economic credentialing may implicate a new form of informed
consent. Under the doctrine of medical malpractice, physicians may
be held liable for inadequate disclosure in obtaining consent for
medical procedure. Likewise, under economic credentialing,
physicians also face potential liability for failing to disclose to the
patient any direct or indirect financial or economic incentives they
may have for limiting testing and treatment.88 Such a scenario
would raise an interesting conundrum for physicians: should they
inform their patients of available diagnostic tests, alternative
treatments, and clinical options to allow patients to elect the best
course of medical action; or should they disclose the economic and
financial constraints that managed care imposes upon them?8
Failure to make either disclosure may expose the physician to
liabilityf 0
A legitimate objective of health care policy is to promote the
improvement of the quality of patient care. 9' Because economic
credentialing defines a physician's qualifications based on economic
criteria unrelated to competency, it is an illegitimate public policy
objective. 92 With economic credentialing, hospitals and HMOs place
the interests of health care corporations before the interests of the
public.93
CONCLUSION

In recent years, the rising cost of health care has resulted in-a
complete overhaul of the practice of medicine. Due to the
increasing financial burden transferred by the government, HMOs,
and insurance company payors, hospitals are seeking ways to
impose financial discipline on physicians to further contain costs.
Hospitals have already found effective means of controlling
physician behavior through the traditional peer review process.
87.
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Hospitals and HMOs are expanding the peer review process
beyond traditional quality of care criteria such as competence,
experience, and skill to include financial and economic factors.
Under an economic credentialing policy, a physician may be
excluded for treating too many poor people, having too many
acutely ill patients, or simply for providing thorough and effective
medical care.
Significantly, economic credentialing raises a host of potential
ethical and legal issues. The failure of hospitals to recognize the
potential legal and ethical consequences of economic credentialing
may ultimately pose the greatest risk to patients. Although
hospitals must continue to be cognizant of the inherent tension
between quality medical care and bottom line business
considerations, a meaningful effort must be made to prevent
economic criteria from serving as the exclusive mechanism for
defining medical care.
The AMA opposes economic credentialing. Nearly all physicians
agree that economic credentialing is unprofessional and unethical.
These physicians would like to use medical competence as the only
standard for credentialing a physician.9 4 California hospitals and
physicians have drafted a mutual agreement on economic
credentialing as an alternative to legislative changes. Their
statement reads: "Termination or granting of medical staff privileges
based solely on economic criteria unrelated to clinical
qualifications, professional responsibilities or quality of care is
inappropriate." 95 Because economic credentialing is still in its
infancy, many states have not addressed this issue.
California was the first state to embrace managed care, and
HMOs have been in business in California for many years.
California Representative, Fortney Stark, Jr., is frustrated by the
obstacles he had to overcome before his grandson could see a
pediatrician. His solution, the "Managed Care Consumer Protection
Act of 1997," H.R. 337, addresses the financial constraints placed
on physicians by managed care. 96 Under his bill, no denial of
medical services would be upheld unless it was issued by a
physician reviewer who is clinically qualified within the same
97
specialty as the recommending physician.
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In 1996, thirty-five states enacted legislation to protect health
care consumers and physicians, aimed at tightening the reins of
managed care corporations, such as HMOs. Economic credentialing
of physicians should be added to the list of issues included in any
list of necessary legislative reforms. The issues now under review
include: gag clauses that prevent physicians from informing
patients of more costly beneficial treatment options, deselection of
physicians by HMOs without just cause, and reimbursement for
emergency room visits if a lay person believes the visit is justified. 98
Physicians need to meet with legislators and lobby for their
profession and patients. Most physicians believe that the goals of
health care reform should include universal access and reasonable
cost control. Policy makers, however, should not interfere with the
integrity of the physician-patient relationship and turn this
relationship into a market arrangement.
Judith E. Orie, M.D.
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